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Abstract 
Assessments of the impact of minimum wages on labor market outcomes in Africa are 
relatively rare. In part this is because the data available do not permit adequate treatment of 
econometric issues that arise in such an assessment. This paper attempts to estimate the impact of 
the introduction of a minimum wage law within the Agriculture sector in South Africa, based on 15 
waves of the biannual Labour Force Survey (LFS), starting in September 2000 and ending in 
September 2007.  The chosen sample includes six waves before the legislation’s effective date 
(March 2003) and nine afterwards. All 15 waves are pooled and treated as repeated cross sections 
over time.   In order to assess whether the changes experienced by farm workers are unique, we 
identify a control group that has similar characteristics to the treatment group.  Our econometric 
approach involves using two alternative specifications of a difference-in-differences model.   We 
test whether employers reduced employment, and whether they responded at the intensive margin 
by reducing hours of work. The law also required non-wage benefits to be implemented, and we 
track the response here in the form of one such provision, namely that of a written contract.  The 
results suggest a significant reduction in employment in Agriculture from the minimum wage, an 
increase in wages on average, no significant change in hours worked and a sharp rise in non-wage 
compliance. 
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Estimating the Impact of Minimum Wages on Employment, Wages and Non-Wage 
Benefits: The Case of Agriculture in South Africa 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The new minimum wage research of Card (1992), Card and Krueger (1994, 1995), 
Neumark and Wascher (1992) generated extensive discussion around the specific effects of 
minimum wage policies in the developed and developing world. Debate was of course 
initially sparked by the provocative findings of David Card and Alan Krueger’s (1994) 
seminal paper on the subject. A portion of subsequent research supports Card and 
Krueger’s findings2. While such findings are compelling and have forced economists to 
reconsider long-held beliefs on the subject they have not overturned the consensus that in 
almost all cases higher wages will reduce employment. The weight of accumulated 
evidence from subsequent work appears to favour a nuanced version of this traditional 
economic rationale. Neumark and Wascher (2007) conclude from their review that there 
are very few if any studies that provide convincing evidence of positive employment 
effects of minimum wages (Neumark and Wascher, 2007:121). In fact evidence shows that 
negative employment effects are consistently apparent when a study does not restrict its 
focus to a narrow sub-group or single industry. The authors add that “studies [which] focus 
on the least-skilled groups provide relatively overwhelming evidence of stronger 
disemployment effects for these groups” (Neumark and Wascher, 2007:121). 
 
In turn, there is an ongoing and burgeoning research agenda in much of the developing 
world, on measuring the impact of minimum wages on employment, poverty and income 
distribution.   Given that many developing countries (and indeed developed countries) have 
some sort of mandatory minimum wage laws, this is not surprising.  Whilst the majority of 
published studies are drawn from Latin American economies 3 there are a sprinkling of 
studies for Asia and Africa4. 
 
Reliable economic research studying the effects of minimum wages in South Africa is 
limited and published work that compares with the international literature is even more so5. 
The most comprehensive research that is available has focused on the effects of the 
minimum wage on domestic workers. Unpublished papers by Hertz (2005, 2006) and more 
recently Dinkelman and Ranchhod (2010) examine the impact of the legislation on a 
number of observables in this sector. The authors use contrasting methodologies but their 
overall conclusions are comparable6. Immediate and significant increases in earnings are 
reported after the introduction of the law in both studies. The requirement for employers to 
                                                 
2 See Machin and Manning (1994), Bhaskar and To (1999), Houba and van Lomwell (2001), Petrakis and Vlassis (2004). The 
explanatino for why minimum wages can increase employment relates to the specific market structure, see Card and Krueger (1994) for a 
full explanation.  
3 For Latin American studies see Alaniz, Gindling & Terrell (2011), Gindling & Terrell (2007) and Gindling & Terrell (2010), Lemos, S 
(2007), Neumark & Wascher (2007), Strobl & Walsh (2003), 
4 For African and Asian studies, outside of South Africa, see Andalon & Pages (2008) and Rama (2001). 
5 One reason for this may be the complex minimum wage schedule in South Africa which makes econometric analysis using the available 
household survey data very difficult. 
6 The most important methodological contrasts between the two papers are that Hertz (2005) employs a difference-in-differences 
approach similar to Card and Krueger (1995) and uses Magisterial Districts as the unit of analysis, while Dinkelman and Ranchhod 
(2010) use a difference-in-differences approach found in Lee (1999) with the Province as the unit of analysis. 
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establish a written contract with employees formed part of the new legislation and again 
both studies found that the number of domestic workers with such contracts increased 
significantly in the post-law period. Regarding employment, Dinkelman and Ranchhod 
(2010) present a model showing that the probability of employment for a typical domestic 
worker is unchanged after the law, while Hertz (2005) suggests that changes in 
employment experienced by domestic workers was no different to workers in other 
occupations. The results suggest that employment was not adversely affected by the law, 
even though wages rose. We employ methods of testing which incorporate the approaches 
used by both authors to examine the case of agricultural workers.  
 
Two additional South African studies analyse the impact of minimum wages in the 
agricultural industry. Conradie (2004), using data from a survey of 190 grape farmers, 
shows that a wage increase of ten percent will decrease employment by between three and 
six percent, depending on the industry. Contrastingly, Murray and Van Walbeeck (2007) 
use data from a survey of 103 sugarcane farmers and report no large disemployment effect 
as a result of the law. The authors do suggest that decreases in the average number of hours 
worked have occurred due to the minimum wage, and that there was a move from labour to 
capital-intensive farming methods where possible.  
 
We contribute thus to the above literature, with an application of the minimum wage 
promulgation in Agriculture, within an emerging market context, South Africa.  The paper 
attempts in the first instance, to estimate the impact of the minimum wage on employment 
and wages within the Agriculture sector.  We then assess whether employers responded at 
the intensive margin by reducing hours of work with the new law.  The law also required 
non-wage benefits to be implemented, and we track the response here in the form of one 
such provision, namely that of a written contract.   
 
 
II.  Methodological Approach and Data 
 
The primary data for this study are drawn from 15 waves of the South African Labour 
Force Survey (LFS), starting in September 2000 and ending in September 2007. These are 
bi-annual, rotating panel, surveys conducted in February/March and September each year 
and all data are self-reported. The chosen sample includes six waves before the 
legislation’s effective date (March 2003) and nine afterwards. All 15 waves are pooled and 
treated as repeated cross sections over time7. The LFS covers approximately 30,000 
households in each wave and this includes between 2,000 and 2,800 farmworkers per wave 
over the period. In order to evaluate which minimum wage applied to each individual it 
was necessary to assign individuals to geographic areas. This was done by matching 
geographical information available in the LFS to areas A and B listed in the Sectoral 
Minimum Wage schedules.  
 
In order to assess whether the changes experienced by farmworkers are unique we identify 
a control group that has similar characteristics to farmworkers. The control group is made 
                                                 
7 We do not use the standard LFS individual-level weights but rather those provided by Branson (2009)7. We continue to use the post-
stratification unit (PSU) and district level weights from the LFS which adjust for the survey design. 
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up of unskilled, non-unionised individuals of working age, who are not covered by another 
sectoral minimum wage which might interfere with the results. Here again, both the 
occupation and industry codes are used to identify this group. For clarity, this group 
includes occupations such as: street vendors, packers, construction workers, manufacturing 
and transport labourers, and elementary machine operators. The agricultural minimum 
wage law does not apply to them. Changes in the control group’s wages, employment, 
contract coverage and hours worked give an indication of movements in the economy when 
the agricultural minimum wage was introduced.  
 
Monthly wages reported in brackets in the LFS are transformed into point estimates by 
random allocation to a uniform distribution within the bracket to maintain variation8. This 
accounts for between five and ten percent of the sample in each wave on average. All 
monthly wages are then combined and converted into hourly wages and wages are deflated 
by the annual Consumer Price Index (CPIX).  
 
The most relevant data limitation with this study is that it is impossible to capture any non-
monetary income received by farmworkers such as housing, food, transport, utilities or any 
other in-kind transfers from employers. Importantly the legislation does restrict such non-
monetary payments to ten percent of a worker’s salary in the case of agriculture and this is 
taken into account where necessary. Nevertheless it is possible that increases in wages after 
the introduction of the law may have been a reallocation of non-pecuniary benefits offered 
in the pre-law period. This is the biggest challenge for analysing wage gains in the sector. 
Secondly, it may be that a common employer response to the law is the casualization of 
labour. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this may be the case in agriculture where 
temporary employment agencies are increasingly prevalent and coordinate less direct 
formal employment (DoL, 2011). There may be a correlation in South Africa between 
stricter wage legislation (higher minimum wages, restrictions on dismissal etc.) and the 
growth of temporary employment services in Agriculture. However, the LFS data on 
seasonal and contract workers within Agriculture does not appear to have changed 
significantly over the period and no data on temporary employment services in Agriculture 
is available.  
 
Approach and Method 
 
Two specifications are used. We first employ a standard difference-in-differences model 
analogous to Card and Krueger (1994): 
 
							 ௜ܻ௞௧ ൌ 	ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܱܲܵ ௧ܶ ൅ ߚଶܨܽݎ݉ݓ݋ݎ݇݁ݎ௞ ൅ ߚଷܱܲܵ ௧ܶ ∗ ܨܽݎ݉ݓ݋ݎ݇݁ݎ௞ ൅ ߝ௜௞௧ 
 (1) 
 
where, ௜ܻ௞௧ is the outcome of interest (wages, contracts, hours worked) for individual i, in 
group  ݇ , in period t. ܱܲܵ ௧ܶ is the time dummy which captures ‘before-and-after’ effects.  ܨܽݎ݉ݓ݋ݎ݇݁ݎ௞ is the dummy for whether an individual is in the treatment or control group 
(k=1, 2), which equals 1 if the individual is a farmworker and 0 if they are in the control 
                                                 
8 A new seed is set in STATA for each bracket calculation. 
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group9. ܱܲܵ ௧ܶ ∗ ܨܽݎ݉ݓ݋ݎ݇݁ݎ௞ is the difference-in-differences term which confirms that 
outcomes are not the result of economy-wide shocks. This ensures that the observed 
changes are not shared by similar workers to whom the law does not apply.   
 
Secondly we specify a difference-in-differences model similar to Card & Krueger (1994) 
which tests to see whether wages increased more in areas where farmworker wages were 
lower in the pre-law period10: 
 
										 ௜ܻ௝௧ ൌ 	ߙ଴ ൅	ߙଵܱܲܵ ௧ܶ ൅	ߙଶܹܩ௝ ൅	ߙଷܱܲܵ ௧ܶ ∗ ܹܩ௝ ൅ 	ߛ ௜ܺ௝௧ ൅ ݒ௜௝௧	,           (2) 
 
where, ௜ܻ௝௧ is the outcome of interest for individual i, living in district j, in period t. ܱܲܵ ௧ܶ 
is the time dummy, and ௜ܺ௝௧ controls for various worker characteristics such as Age, 
Education and Race. The wage gap (ܹܩ௝) is a constructed variable which identifies cross-
sectional variation between District Councils in the pre-law period. The wage gap is 
represented by: 
 
	ܹܩ௝ ൌ log	ሾ݉݁݀݅ܽ݊൫ݓ௝∗൯ሿ െ log	ሾ݉݁݀݅ܽ݊ሺݓ௝ᇱ)],   
 (3) 
 
where ݓ௝∗ is the median wage of the control group in district j and ݓ௝ᇱ is the median 
agricultural worker wage in district j. The wage gap is calculated using full-time wages in 
2002. This identifies the gap in wages between the two groups of workers for each district, 
in the pre-law period, and captures the intensity of the law. Areas with a larger gap would 
be expected to experience greater increases in wages in the post-law period if the law was 
binding. Comparison with the chosen control group accounts for any changes in wages that 
affected all workers over the period and controls for wage differences that are linked to 
geography.  
 
In equation (1) ߚଵ indicates the changes in the post-law period for both groups, ߚଶ gives the 
average difference between farmworkers and the control group over the full period, and 	βଷ 
shows the change for farmworkers in the post-law period relative to the control group. In 
equation (2) the parameter ߙଶ represents the average difference in outcomes for workers in 
low wage gap versus high wage gap areas across the entire period. 	αଷ is the difference-in-
differences parameter and tells us how much more outcomes changed in the post-law 
period, in areas where the wage gap was largest. Lastly, ߙଵ is also of interest as it tells us 
how the variable of interest changed on average after the law. As in all such natural 
experiments I must assume that in the absence of the law agricultural wages would be on 
the same general trend across districts as well as for both groups of workers. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Recall that the control is made up of demographically similar workers not covered by the minimum wage law. Characteristics of the 
control group are presented in the following section and shown in Table 2.  
10 Dinkelman and Ranchhod (2010) have recently also applied a similar approach to Card and Krueger in their of domestic workers. 
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III.   Descriptive Statistics  
 
Despite contributing less than three percent to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) between 
2000 and 2007 agriculture remains a real economy anchor for the South African economy 
in many respects.  The sector accounts for almost ten percent of formal employment 
(StatsSA, 2008). A major purpose of the agricultural minimum wage law was to provide 
protection for workers in a sector which is poorly unionised and reports the lowest average 
wages in the country. In addition to setting a legal wage floor, the new law also outlined 
terms and conditions of employment for the farming sector which included maximum 
working hours and the establishment of a written employment contract for employees. The 
minimum wage law was published on the 2nd of December 2002 and came into effect on 
the 16th of December 200211. Provisions related to the minimum wage, however, only 
came into effect on the 1st of March 2003. September 2003 is treated as the first wave 
where the impacts of the law should be evident. Two separate wage levels are prescribed 
for full-time farmworkers, according to geographic location: a higher minimum wage for 
those working within urbanised municipal areas (Area A) and a lower wage for 
predominantly rural areas (Area B)12. In March 2003 when the law was introduced these 
were, Rands 800 and Rands 600 per month, respectively. The minimum wage is regularly 
updated for inflation through a formal government gazetting process which is publicly 
available on the Department of Labour’s (DoL) website. These minima were set relatively 
high upon introduction, at around the 70th percentile of the wage distribution in both cases. 
 
The introduction of minimum wages appears to have had some immediate and substantial 
effects for the farmworkers covered by the law. Table 1 provides an overview of workers in 
the agricultural sector by presenting key features of the sample over time. The typical 
demographic of a farmworker in South Africa is clear. Most individuals in the sample are 
African, male, have few years of education (less than six), and are engaged in full-time 
employment. Table 2 provides an equivalent set of data for the chosen control group. The 
similarities of this group are immediately evident. These workers are also typically African, 
male, have between seven and eight years of education, and work full time.  
 
Considering the first row of Table 1, it is evident that the number of farm workers sampled 
in each wave remains relatively stable over the period. This is reassuring and should 
increase the reliability of the weighted estimates. Changes in employment are the first area 
of interest.  The figures in Table 1 show that the number of farmworkers falls by almost 
200 000 between Sept. 2002 and Sept. 2003, which is a decrease of over 20 percent. Table 
2 provides comparable data on the change in the number of workers in the control group, 
where a gradual increase in employment can be observed. This gives an initial indication 
that farmworker employment fell as a result of the law. The data shows that over the period 
employment in the control group rises steadily over time while farmworker employment 
starts falling in March 2003 (the law was announced in December 2002) and does not 
                                                 
11 The initial legislation for the farming sector was outlined in Sectoral Determination 8 and then later updated by Sectoral Determination 
13 (Department of Labour; 2002, 2006). 
12 This demarcation was based on the average household income recorded for the municipal area concerned in the 1996 census, where: 
A. Average income greater than Rands 24, 000 per annum 
B. Average income between Rands 12, 000 and Rands 24, 000 per annum. 
Since 2009 this distinction between areas has been removed.  
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recover. To rule out the possibility that this decrease may have been driven by economic 
conditions in the agricultural sector Table 3 details average growth levels over the period. 
The growth in agricultural Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was approximately one percent 
and thus while employment losses may have come from increased capitalisation of farming 
activities it is implausible that the sector was forced to shed jobs due to contracting output. 
 
Figures 1 and 2 contain kernel density plots of hourly wages for September 2001 – 
September 2007. Each line is a smoothed plot of the log of real wages. The figures use data 
from the September waves of the LFS and therefore include two waves before the law’s 
introduction and five thereafter. The vertical line represents the full-time urban minimum 
wage in 2007. Figure 1 presents hourly and monthly farmworker earnings, respectively. In 
the pre-law period (shown by the black and grey lines) there is no evidence that earnings 
are shifting in real terms; in fact the 2001 distribution is slightly to the right of the 
distribution in 2002 suggesting a slight decline in real earnings. However, the distribution 
shifts noticeably to the right in September 2003, ten months after the announcement of the 
law. The distribution then gradually moves to the right for all of the post-law years, with 
the final wave being most pronounced. Testing for distributional differences using the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests shows that each of the post-law distributions is significantly 
different from those before the law was introduced, at the 5 percent level.  
 
Figure 2 plots the distribution of real hourly wages, for the control group. The kernel 
density plots suggest that no significant changes in wages have occurred for the control 
group over the period. Testing for this statistically, using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
confirms that none of the post-law distributions are significantly different from the 
distributions in the period prior to the introduction of the law. As a comparison with the 
wage increases experienced by farmworkers these figures suggest that the law had an 
observable and substantial impact in the agricultural sector.   
 
The third variable of interest in this study is the existence of a formal employment contract 
for farmworkers. Establishing such a contract was mandated by the new law and can be 
observed in the data. The final row of Table 1 provides information on the percentage of 
workers in the sector who hold such contracts. It is evident that this proportion rises 
considerably between September 2002 and September 2003, coverage increases by 17 
percent over the 12 month period. It has almost doubled by September 2007. A significant 
portion of this increase appears to be a result of the legislation when the control group is 
used as a comparison. Although it is unclear what regulations govern the establishment of 
contracts for workers in the control group the timing of the increase in Table 1 is 
informative when compared to the gradual changes observable in Table 2. The largest 
increase over a 12 month period in the control group is six percent.  
 
The fourth and final variable of interest is the number of hours worked, which could be 
expected to change as a result of the law. In theory employers may reduce demand at the 
intensive margin in order to comply with the 45 hours per week maximum set out in the 
Minimum Wage schedule, or else simply to afford the higher wage. Hamermesh (1993) 
argued that, ‘employers are quicker to alter hours in response to shocks than they are to 
change levels of employment’ (p. 294). Further, if employers have to increase wages due to 
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the law they might require more productivity per hour from each worker and in this way be 
able to reduce demand at the intensive margin. Alternatively, it is a common stylized fact 
that full-time workers earn more than similar part-time employees. This suggests that full-
timer workers produce more per hour. If this is true, firms may lengthen work-weeks rather 
than reduce them in response to a minimum wage increase (Brown, 1999). The theoretical 
effect of minimum wages on hours worked is therefore ambiguous. Hertz (2005) finds that 
the minimum wage reduced hours of work for domestic workers in South Africa. 
Contradicting this Dinkelman and Ranchhod (2010) find no evidence that employers 
adjusted on the intensive margin to accommodate the minimum wage law for domestic 
workers. Expectations as to the Agricultural Sector’s response in this regard are thus 
unclear.  
 
In contrast to the changes observed in employment, wages, and contract coverage, Table 1 
suggests that average hours of work in the agricultural sector remained unaffected by the 
law. No definite trend in hours worked can be isolated from the data. Similarly, average 
hours worked among individuals in the control group appears relatively stable across the 
period. What is evident is that on average farmworkers report working more than 45 hours 
per week for every year. To examine the changes in hours worked more critically, Figure 8 
plots a kernel density function. The vertical line is placed at 45 hour per week. The density 
plot confirms that no significant changes in hours worked have taken place over the period. 
This result, together with the observed changes in employment and wages, suggests that 
perhaps employers adjusted at the extensive margin to afford the larger wage bill and thus 
the law had little impact at the intensive margin.  
 
IV.   Econometric Results 
 
Table 4 presents the difference-in-differences results for the probability of retaining 
employment as a farm worker with the onset of the minimum wage law. The binary 
dependent variable is whether an individual works as a farmworker (one) or not (zero), and 
the second column includes controls for individual worker characteristics. The sample 
includes farmworkers and all demographically similar individuals who are either employed 
or looking for work13. Using this sample allows for farmworkers to lose or switch jobs in 
the post-law period. If employment has in fact fallen for farmworkers due to the law, as the 
descriptive data shows, then one should see a decrease in the probability of farm 
employment after March 2003. The results show that the probability of an individual in the 
sample working as a farmworker has fallen by between 14-15% in the period after the law. 
Interestingly, the results indicate that the probability of agricultural employment is slightly 
higher in areas where the wage gap was bigger. This could simply be picking up districts 
with more farmworkers and therefore lower wages. The results also show that the 
probability of farm employment after the law is slightly lower in areas where the wage gap 
was largest. The coefficients are all significant. This result, together with the descriptive 
data which illustrates the trends in the number of farmworkers over time, provides 
compelling evidence that the minimum wage has had observable disemployment effects in 
the agricultural sector.  
                                                 
13 The sample includes individuals of working age, in elementary occupations, who earn low wages, and hold education levels of no 
greater that matric. 
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Regarding earnings, we consider the descriptive data to be compelling evidence of a large 
shift in wages due to the introduction of the new law; the density plots in particular make 
this clear. In order though to isolate the effect of the law the difference-in-differences 
approach tests whether farm workers experienced significant changes in wages in the post-
law period when compared to a similar group of workers not covered by the law. The 
results from Table 5 suggest that this does appear to be the case. It is also shown that 
districts with a higher wage gap experienced greater wage increases after the law. 
 
Specifically then, column 1 of Table 5 compares the wage outcomes of farmworkers 
against wages of the control group, using equation 1, as specified above. Results show that 
wages in the post-law period have risen by approximately 28%, for all workers in the 
sample. The farmworker dummy variable indicates that, when compared to individuals in 
the control group, farmworkers earn significantly lower wages. On average farmworker 
wages are over 50% lower than the wages earned by similar workers in other occupations; 
over the entire sample period. Of principal interest is the difference-in-differences 
estimator which reveals how much wages have risen for farmworkers in the post-law 
period relative to those in the control group. The output shows that the estimated effect of 
the law on farmworker wages was an increase of 17.6%. This outcome controls for the 
difference between the two groups as well as possible biases emanating from trends over 
time.  
 
The output in columns two and three of Table 5 use the approach outlined in equation 2 to 
see whether the wage increases for farmworkers were larger in districts where the wage gap 
was greater. Column 3 includes controls for education, age, and race. The pre-law wage 
gap is defined so that districts with lower farmworker wages (relative to the wage of the 
control group) result in a bigger wage gap. Examining the output one can see that an 
increase in wages of between 34-38% is evident in the post-law period. The results in 
column 1 revealed that approximately half of this increase (17%) can be attributed to the 
law. Inspecting the wage gap coefficients it is clear that farmworker wages are lower in 
districts where the gap is bigger. The coefficient on ܱܲܵ ௧ܶ ∗ ܹܩ௝ is large, significant and 
positive in both specifications. This suggests that areas with a bigger wage gap in the pre-
law period saw greater increases in earnings after the law was introduced. Overall these are 
interesting findings; not only have farmworker wages risen in the post-law period relative 
to counterparts in other occupations, they have risen significantly more in District Councils 
where the gap between the control and treatment group wage was larger.  
 
Regarding contract coverage the difference-in-differences output clearly confirms the 
pattern observed in the descriptive statistics. Table 6 presents the same set of regressions as 
for wages, where column 1 is based on equation 1 and columns 2 and 3 are estimates of 
equation 2. The dependent variable is whether an individual has a written employment 
contract or not. Column 1 shows a 12 percentage point increase in the fraction of 
farmworkers and control group workers who hold a written contract after the law, so 
contract coverage appears to have increased for both groups. It is also clear from the results 
that fewer farmworkers have written contracts than their counterparts in the control group 
(around 17% less). The interaction term is again of leading interest and indicates that 
employment contracts increased by 15.6% for farmworkers in the post-law period. 
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Columns 2 and 3, which focus exclusively on the sample of farmworkers, also point out 
large and significant growth in contract coverage after the law. Additionally, these 
regressions show that districts with a larger wage gap in the pre-law period have fewer 
individuals with contracts, but that coverage increased by more in these areas after the law. 
These econometric results demonstrate that the formalisation of employment for 
farmworkers, from the point of contract coverage, has been positively affected by the 
legislation. 
 
Lastly, Table 7 presents results from the regression analysis on changes in hours worked 
from 2000-2007. The same set of three regressions is run. None of the coefficients are 
statistically different from zero. The exception is the farmworker dummy variable in 
column 1 which simply shows that on average across all waves farmworkers work 1.6 
hours more than their control group counterparts. The fact that no significant changes at the 
intensive margin are evident for farmworkers confirms the descriptive overview. It is 
possible that measurement error in reporting hours of work may have biased these results. 
However, apart from this possibility there is no statistical evidence indicating that 
employers have adjusted average hours of work to accommodate the large wage increases.  
 
V.   Conclusion 
 
Our results suggest that the sectoral minimum wage law in Agriculture in South Africa had 
had significant effects, as farmworker wages rose by approximately 17% as a result of the 
law. Examining the difference-in-difference results it was also clear that wages rose by 
more in districts where the wage gap, between farmworker wages and control group wages, 
was higher. In other words, districts where farmworker wages were far below the median 
wages of similar workers experienced greater wage increases. This was evident despite the 
fact that approximately 60% of farmworkers still received sub-minimum wages in 2007. 
Regarding non-pecuniary benefits, the law also substantially increased contract coverage 
for farmworkers in South Africa. The number of workers with a written employment 
contract increased to reach 57% in 2007.  
 
In examining the effect that the minimum wage had on employment, this paper shows that 
while no adjustments at the intensive margin were observed, employment fell significantly 
in response to the law. This was evident in the descriptive statistics, particularly when 
employment changes are compared to those experienced by the control group. Additionally 
the probability of employment as a farmworker was shown to have fallen by approximately 
13% in the post-law period. Such effects are largely supported by the new minimum wage 
literature where Neumark and Wascher (2007) emphasise that disemployment effects are 
more likely when aggregate data is analysed and particularly for unskilled workers.  
 
Finally, a key caveat to the study is that the data covers a relatively short period of time 
after the introduction of the law. In the longer term, as the agricultural sector responds to 
this legislation, the effects observed here may change. Future studies may find valuable 
insight in examining the fluctuating nature of agricultural employment to see how 
employers respond to the legislation over time both at the extensive and intensive margin. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Average Characteristics of Farmworkers (2000-2007) 
 
 
Table 2: Average Characteristics of the Control Group (2000-2007) 
 
 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
N 2 730 2 433 2 738 2 055 2 399 2 438 2 453 2 366
Weighted 805 715 804 162 819 048 623 750 538 538 515 046 513 332 553 806
Area A 0.48 0.51 0.46 0.47 0.39 0.34 0.36 0.37
Age 36 37 37 37 38 37 38 37
Education 5.50 5.42 5.34 5.54 5.45 5.82 5.94 6.03
Male 0.69 0.73 0.70 0.72 0.70 0.73 0.69 0.71
African 0.84 0.74 0.79 0.76 0.82 0.81 0.82 0.83
Full‐Time 0.85 0.94 0.89 0.97 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.93
Hours per Week 46 51 48 50 49 49 48 46
Nominal Monthly Wage 630 707 684 857 920 1036 1242 1337
Nominal Hourly Wage 2.8 3.3 3.1 4.1 4.3 4.8 5.9 6.5
Fraction < Min. (Area A) 0.82 0.71 0.72 0.62 0.64 0.63 0.60 0.59
Fraction < Min. (Area B) 0.86 0.79 0.82 0.63 0.62 0.64 0.64 0.66
Written Contract 0.31 0.30 0.34 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.53 0.56
Figures  are calculated from the South African Labour Force Surveys  (LFS) for September 2000‐September 2007. All  statistics  
are weighted.  Full  time workers are those working more than 27 hours  per week. The dashed red l ine indicates  the timing of 
the law (March 2003). The wage variables  presented are medians  for full‐time workers. Noncompliance before 2003 is  
based on the minima adjusted backwards  using the formula contained in the Agricultural  Sectoral  Determination.
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
N 4 121 3 773 3 603 3 379 3 781 4 455 4 456 4 228
Weighted 1 785 730 1 600 441 1 636 771 1 682 776 1 796 746 2 162 153 2 128 327 2 038 391
Area A 0.57 0.56 0.58 0.55 0.44 0.41 0.42 0.41
Age 38 41 40 40 38 44 46 41
Education 7.65 7.72 7.88 8.05 8.25 8.27 8.37 8.25
Male 0.62 0.59 0.62 0.56 0.62 0.58 0.58 0.61
African 0.83 0.85 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.86 0.85 0.86
Full‐Time 0.87 0.88 0.90 0.89 0.90 0.89 0.90 0.89
Hours per Week 45 43 45 46 46 46 45 45
Mean Monthly Wage 1 321 1 210 1 307 1 367 1 441 1 492 1 736 1 961
Mean Hourly Wage 6.24 5.84 6.16 6.83 7.17 7.01 8.58 9.91
Fraction < Farm Min.* 0.34 0.37 0.33 0.30 0.33 0.36 0.32 0.28
Written Contract 0.46 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.63 0.57 0.60 0.64
Figures  are calculated from the South African Labour Force Surveys  (LFS) for September 2000‐September 2007. All  
statistics  are weighted.  Full  time workers  are those working more than 27 hours  per week. The dashed red l ine 
indicates  the timing of the law (March 2003). The wage variables  presented are medians  for full‐time workers. * The 
minimum used is  for farmworkers in Area A.
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Table 3: Gross Domestic Product and Value added by Industry (Constant 2005 Prices) 
  2000 2007 2000-2007 
Growth 
Rate   
R 
Million Share 
R 
Million Share 
Primary Sectors         
Agriculture, forestry and 
fishing 34 787  3.0% 36 301  2.3% 1.2% 
Mining and quarrying 99 069  8.6% 105 336 6.7% 0.6% 
Secondary Sectors         
Manufacturing 222 579  19.2% 290 246 18.6% 4.4% 
Electricity, gas and water 28 597  2.5% 35 294  2.3% 3.1% 
Construction 26 410  2.3% 48 971  3.1% 8.8% 
Tertiary Sectors         
Wholesale, retail, motor 
trade and accommodation 161 503  14.0% 217 607 13.9% 4.8% 
Transport, storage and 
communication 102 874  8.9% 156 289 10.0% 6.4% 
Finance, real estate and 
business services 216 747  18.7% 349 501 22.4% 6.6% 
General government 
services 191 340  16.5% 223 618 14.3% 1.9% 
Personal services 75 735  6.5% 98 247  6.3% 3.9% 
Aggregate GDP 1 157 441    
1 561 
410    4.4% 
Source: Own Calculations (StatsSA, 2011) 
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Figure 1: Distribution of Farmworker Log Real Hourly Wages (2001-2007) 
 
Data are from the September Waves of the LFS 2001-2007. The vertical line is the level of 
the full-time minimum wage in 2003. Each wave of data contains between 1811 and 2417 
observations. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for equality of distributions are rejected at the 5% 
level for each pairwise comparison of waves in the before and after periods. 
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Figure 2: Distribution of Control Group Log Real Hourly Earnings (2001-2007) 
 
Data are from the September Waves of the LFS 2001-2007. The vertical line is the level of 
the full-time minimum wage in 2003. Each wave of data contains between 3801 and 4507 
observations. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for equality of distributions are not rejected at the 
5% level for each pairwise comparison of waves in the before and after periods. 
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Figure 3: Usual number of hours worked per week 
 
Data are from the September Waves of the LFS 2001-2007. The vertical line is set at 45 
hours. Each wave of data contains between 1809 and 2381 observations. Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests for equality of distributions are not rejected at the 5% level for each pairwise 
comparison of waves in the before and after periods. 
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Table 4: Probability of working as a Farmworker 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
      
POST -0.1528*** 
-
0.13676***
  (0.00161) (0.00155) 
Wage Gap 0.0364*** 0.0229*** 
  (0.00222) (0.00215) 
Wage Gap*POST -0.0418*** -0.0327*** 
  (0.00270) (0.00261) 
Controls for Education, Age, African NO YES 
Constant 0.0580*** 0.378*** 
  (0.00128) (0.00272) 
      
Observations 320,171 320,171 
R-squared 0.002 0.072 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are weighted. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is whether 
the individual is employed as a farmworker (1) or not (0). The 
sample includes individuals of working age who are unemployed or 
searching for work who have no more than 12 years of education. 
POST = 1 after March 2003 and 0 otherwise. The Wage Gap is the 
district level difference between the log of median farmworker 
wages and the log of median wages for the control group.  
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Table 5: Log Hourly Wages, Difference-in-Differences 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
        
POST 0.284*** 0.340*** 0.388*** 
  (0.00840) (0.0624) (0.0530) 
Farmworker 
-
0.548***     
  (0.0118)     
Farmworker*POST 0.176***     
  (0.0157)     
Wage Gap   -0.154* -0.1394* 
    (0.0811) (0.0708) 
Wage Gap*POST   0.221** 0.1751** 
    (0.101) (0.0907) 
Controls for Age, African, 
Education   NO YES 
Constant 1.338*** 0.871*** 0.687*** 
  (0.00666) (0.0495) (0.0560) 
        
Observations 90,986 33,892 33,575 
R-squared 0.063 0.068 0.228 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. All regressions are weighted. Regression 1 is run on the sample 
of farmworkers and the control group. Regressions 2 and 3 include 
only farmworkers. Regressions have the 'Log of Hourly Wages' as 
dependent variables. POST = 1 after March 2003 and 0 otherwise. 
The Wage Gap is the district level difference between the log of 
median farmworker wages and the log of median wages for the 
control group.  
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Table 6: Contract Coverage, Difference-in-Differences 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
        
POST 0.124*** 0.140*** 0.169*** 
  (0.00475) (0.0145) (0.0144) 
Farmworker -0.170***     
  (0.00613)     
Farmworker*POST 0.0561***     
  (0.00801)     
Controls for Education, Age, African   NO YES 
Wage Gap   -0.178*** -0.132*** 
    (0.0189) (0.0188) 
Wage Gap*POST   0.0876*** 0.0331 
Constant 0.496*** 0.421*** 0.443*** 
  (0.00382) (0.0108) (0.0128) 
        
Observations 69,743 31,218 31,017 
R-squared 0.040 0.038 0.064 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All 
regressions are weighted. Regression 1 is run on the sample of farmworkers and the 
control group. Regressions 2 and 3 include only farmworkers. The dependent 
variable is whether the individual has a written employment contract (1) or not (0). 
POST = 1 after March 2003 and 0 otherwise. The Wage Gap is the district level 
difference between the log of median farmworker wages and the log of median 
wages for the control group. 
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Table 7: Usual Hours of Work, Difference-in-Differences 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
        
POST 0.1807 0.0268 0.190 
  (0.132) (1.078) (1.075) 
Farmworker 1.642***     
  (0.189)     
Farmworker*POST 0.106     
  (0.0911)     
Controls for Education, Age, African   NO YES 
Wage Gap   1.085 1.096 
    (1.670) (1.650) 
Wage Gap*POST   -0.455 -0.579 
    (1.897) (1.881) 
Constant 47.53*** 48.60*** 50.21*** 
  (0.105) (0.892) (0.939) 
        
Observations 95,399 34,560 34,231 
R-squared 0.003 0.000 0.004 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All 
regressions are weighted. Regression 1 is run on the sample of farmworkers and the 
control group. Regressions 2 and 3 include only farmworkers. The dependent 
variable is whether the individual has a written employment contract (1) or not (0). 
POST = 1 after March 2003 and 0 otherwise. The Wage Gap is the district level 
difference between the log of median farmworker wages and the log of median 
wages for the control group.  
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